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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how individual preferences for income redistribution are 
influenced by social capital, which is measured by rates of participation in 
community activities. Individual-level data and place of residence data were 
combined to examine how social capital accumulated in residential areas influences 
an individual‘s preference for income redistribution. After controlling for individual 
characteristics, I obtained the following key findings: people are more likely to 
prefer income redistribution in areas with higher rates of community participation. 
This tendency is more clearly observed in high-income groups than in low-income 
groups. This implies that one‘s preference for income redistribution is influenced by 
psychological externalities. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A major role of governments is to reduce income inequality via income 
redistribution policies. Income redistribution increases the welfare of the poor, 
while decreasing that of the wealthy. Income inequality also has several indirect 
effects—it can lead to a decrease in trust among people (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2002) and impede levels of community involvement (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; 
La Ferrara 2002). Social capital, which is defined as trust or participation within a 
community, is considered to play a critical role in increasing social welfare (Putnam 
1993; 2000). Hence, income redistribution is thought to increase social welfare, in 
part through social capital formation. However, the reverse causality that social 
capital influences political redistribution has not been investigated to date, with the 
exception of Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011).2 
Since 2000, a growing number of studies have attempted to explore how and why 
people prefer income redistribution (e.g., Ravallian and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and 
and Gruüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008; Alesina 
and Giuliano 2009; Klor and Shayo 2010). Theoretical models suggest that 
expectations of upward and downward mobility play an important role in 
determining individual attitudes toward redistribution (Piketty, 1995). The 
―prospect of upward mobility‖ hypothesis supposes that people who expect to move 
up the income scale will not favor a distributive policy even if they are currently 
poor (Bénabou and OK, 2001). This hypothesis is empirically supported by prior 
works (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Siedler, 2008). In contrast, it has 
also been found that people with current wealth tend to support redistribution if 
they expect their welfare to fall (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). 
The existing literature that explores the determinants of preference for 
redistribution does not sufficiently consider the effect of interaction among people. 
However, an individual‘s perception and behavior are thought to be influenced by 
the people around them and the neighboring community structure (e.g., Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2000;2002; La Ferrara 2002; Jensen and Harris 2008; Shields et al., 
2009). There are empirical works that support the hypothesis that it is ―relative‖ 
income rather than ―absolute income‖ that has an effect on the degree of happiness 
(e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; McBride, 2001; 
                                                   
2 Using cross-country data, Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) found that trust aids the 
creation of welfare states, reducing inequality. Algan and Cahuc (2010) also attempted 
to tackle a similar question. 
  
Stutzer 2004; Luttmer 2005). Veblen (1899) argued that ―conspicuous consumption‖ 
by rich people serves to impress other people. However, it seems plausible that poor 
people envy rich people, and therefore hope that the rich will become poor. Owing to 
such externalities, rich people are likely to be unhappy. In this case, rich people 
tend to support income redistribution, thereby reducing the externality, and 
achieving increased levels of happiness3. This possibility seems to be more likely 
when the rich and poor meet and interact more frequently. In other words, rich 
people are more likely to support income redistribution when people are more 
inclined to participate in social activities. However, little is known regarding the 
interaction mechanism for redistribution. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine how 
and the extent to which the preference for redistribution is affected by interactions 
among people. Furthermore, preference appears to be significantly affected by 
structure and traditional societal values (Alesina et al. 2004; Chang 2010). However, 
existing literature on redistribution preferences has focused largely on Western 
countries, with the exception of Ohtake and Tomioka (2004) and Chang (2010). 
Asian countries are characterized by the fact that their cultures and societies are 
different from those of Western countries, and as such it would be a valuable and 
necessary exercise to consider the preference for income redistribution in Asian 
countries. To this end, this paper attempts to compare the effect of social capital on 
preferences for redistribution between poor and rich groups using Japanese General 
Social Surveys (JGSS), which include more than 10,000 observations. I found that 
people are more inclined to prefer income redistribution in areas where residents 
are more actively involved in community activities. This tendency was more clearly 
observed for people from high-income groups than with people in low-income groups. 
This paper is in line with Alesina et al (2004), which marks the crossroad for the 
determinants of happiness and preferences for redistribution.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the testable 
hypotheses are discussed. Section 3 provides an explanation regarding data and the 
empirical method used. Section 4 presents the estimation results and their 
interpretation. The final section offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
The seminal work of Becker (1974) stated that social interaction is defined in 
                                                   
3 Social capital possibly influences the fairness of people, leading to change the 
equilibrium level of redistribution (Galasso 2003). 
  
terms of a consumption externality or as the utility function of a person to include 
the reactions of others in his/her actions. Along similar lines, there is an argument 
that relative income is related to happiness (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark 
and Postlewaite, 1998; McBride, 2001; Luttmer 2005). Luttmer concluded ―that the 
negative effect of a neighbor ‘s earnings on well-being is real and that it is most 
likely caused by a psychological externality‖ (Luttmer 2005, 990). It follows from 
this that an individual‘s preference depends, in part, on those that surround them 
(Luttmer 2001). Furthermore, frequency of contact with neighboring people 
reinforces this effect (Stutzer 2004). Luttmer provided the evidence that ―increased 
neighbors‘ earnings have the strongest negative effect on happiness for those who 
socialize more in their neighborhood‖ (Luttmer 2005, 989–990).  
If one‘s household income is higher than the average household income within a 
residential area, they are considered as relatively wealthy. The remainder of the 
people are regarded as relatively poor. Rich people are more likely to meet people 
with lower household income than to meet higher-income people within their 
residential area. In contrast, poorer people are more likely to meet people with 
higher household incomes than people with lower incomes within their residential 
area. As suggested in previous works, people tend to consider the extent to which 
their income is higher (or lower) than the income of others. That is, people are 
believed to care about their relative position. Because of interpersonal preferences, 
higher earnings of neighbors are related with lower levels of happiness (e.g., Frank, 
1985; Luttmer, 2005; Layard, 1980). ―An envious or malicious person presumably 
would feel better off if some other persons become worse off in certain respects. He 
could ―harm‖ himself (i.e., spend his own resources) in order to harm others‖ 
(Becker 1996, 190). Further, envy possibly causes poorer people to engage in 
criminal behaviors such as theft or vandalism, not only to increase their ―wealth‖ 
but also to reduce rich people‘s wealth (Skaperdas, 1992; Mitsopoulos, 2009). Thus, 
such criminal behavior caused by envy is considered to result in ―illegal‖ income 
redistribution.  
When there is greater societal interaction among residents (i.e., more frequent 
contact between rich and poor), there is also an increase in the degree of envy felt by 
poorer residents toward the richer ones, leading to an increase in negative effects 
(crimes committed against them by the poor) on the wealthy. Hence, I advance 
Hypothesis 14: 
                                                   
4 It should be noted that Hypothesis 1 will only hold if comparison effects actually 
pertain. This is because comparison effects are difficult to separate from purely 
  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
  Poor people are more inclined to prefer income redistribution when they live in 
areas where residents are more likely to interact with each other. 
 
This effect gives poorer people an incentive to support a ―legal‖ redistribution 
policy. In contrast, richer people are more averse to redistribution simply because 
redistribution policies transfer their income to the poor. For example, a rich person‘s 
welfare depends not only on his/her own income and consumption levels but also on 
how the neighboring poorer people view his/her income and consumption. If a rich 
person enjoys the goodwill of those neighboring him/her or fears their envy, that 
rich person may transfer some of his/her own income to them up to the point where 
his/her marginal utility loss from the income transfer equals the marginal utility 
gain owing to an improvement in the evaluation from the neighboring people. As a 
consequence, a rich person‘s utility is maximized. To put it more concisely, when the 
effect of negative externality caused by the envy of poorer people outweighs the 
negative effect of a reduction of income caused by a redistribution policy, rich people 
will support a redistribution policy. Whether rich people prefer income 
redistribution depends on the frequency of interaction among residents because the 
negative externality is considered to be an increasing function of contact with 
neighboring poor people5. This leads me to propose Hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
  Rich people are more inclined to prefer income redistribution when they live in an 
area where residents are more likely to interact with each other. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
This paper used JGSS data, which are individual-level data.6 JGSS surveys use 
                                                                                                                                                     
individual aspiration effects at the individual level (Stutzer, 2004). 
5 There are possibly other mechanisms with which to arrive at Hypothesis 2. For 
instance, richer people support redistribution from purely moral or altruistic motives. 
In addition, it can be argued that richer people tend to display their charitable natures 
to the poor only in surveys, and in reality they are not.  
6Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
  
a two-stage stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan from 
2000. This paper used a dataset covering 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 
2008.7 JGSS was designed as a Japanese counterpart to the General Social Survey 
(GSS) from the United States. JGSS asks standard questions concerning an 
individual‘s characteristics via face-to-face interviews. The data cover information 
related to preferences regarding income redistribution policies, marital and 
demographic (age and gender) status, annual household income8, years of schooling, 
age, prefecture of residence, and prefecture of residence at 15 years old. A Japanese 
prefecture is the equivalent to a state in the United States or a province in Canada. 
There are 47 prefectures in Japan, and the average values for the variables 
included in the JGSS can be calculated for each prefecture. The construction of the 
research sample is presented in Table 1. Data were collected from 22,796 adults, 
between 20 and 89 years old. Respondents did not answer all of the survey 
questions; therefore, data regarding some variables are not available, and the 
number of samples used in the regression estimations is reduced, ranging between 
11,048 and 11,808. The use of JGSS data in this paper has certain advantages. First, 
compared with international data (e.g., Crneo and Gruüner, 2002; Alesina and 
Angeletos, 2005, Aristei and Perugini, 2010), ―within country analysis is much less 
likely to be subject to measurement error due to changes in institutional structures 
of redistributive policies‖ (Alesina and Giuliano 2009, 22). Second, previous works 
related to preferences for income redistribution used the United States GSS (e.g., 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Derin-Güre and Uler, 
2010). JGSS was designed as the Japanese counterpart to the United States GSS, 
and therefore analysis using JGSS enables researchers to compare findings 
between Japan and United States. Recent studies have highlighted the significant 
effect that cultural and social backgrounds have on ―happiness‖ (Alesina et al., 
2004), as well as their influence on individual preferences for income redistribution 
(Luttmer 2011). Hence, the findings of this paper will help researchers to examine 
how social, historical, and cultural differences influence redistribution preferences. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Tokyo. 
7Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. Surveys were conducted in 2009 and 
2010 but the data is not available.  
8In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and we 
assumed that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For the top category 
of ―23 million yen and above,‖ I assumed that everybody earned 23 million yen. Of the 
11,808 observations used in the regression estimations, there were only 116 
observations in this category. Therefore, the problem of top-coding should not be an 
issue here. 
  
Finally, previous works have not fully investigated how and why Japanese people 
prefer redistribution, with the exception of Ohtake and Tomioka (2004). Ohtake and 
Tomioka (2004) used a smaller sample (approximately 1,000 observations) than that 
used in this paper. The JGSS data used in this paper contain approximately 11,000 
observations, and as such these results are more accurate and reliable than 
previous works. 
Following the discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of participation in 
community activities is considered to be social capital in this research. The aim of 
this paper is to examine the externality from neighboring people on preferences for 
income redistribution policies. The influence of neighboring people is thought to be 
greater when people are more likely to participate in community activities. That is, 
people are influenced by neighboring people to a greater extent when they live in 
areas with higher levels of community involvement. In 1996, the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation conducted a survey on the consciousness and behaviors of 
prefecture residents, capturing community activity involvement rates in prefectures 
(Japan Broadcasting Corporation 1997). One of the survey questions asked ―Do you 
actively participate in community activities?‖ Respondents could choose one of three 
responses: ―yes‖, ―unsure‖, or ―no‖. I calculated the rates for those who answered 
―yes‖ within a prefecture, and used this value as a measure of social capital 
(however, it should be noted that care should be taken with regard to the definition 
of social capital). Furthermore, I assumed that the rate of participation in 
community activities was stable over time. As mentioned earlier, there are 47 
prefectures, and I obtained a proxy for each prefecture9.  
Gini data coefficients for prefecture level household income were calculated 
using data from the ―National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure‖, 
conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (1999, 2004). 
These surveys are conducted every 5 years, e.g., 1999, 2004, and 2009. However, the 
data for 2009 are not available. The data used in this paper cover the period 
2000–2008. Therefore, as explained in the following section, I used Gini coefficients 
                                                   
9 Trust is regarded as a kind of social capital (Putnam, 2000). Generalized trust is 
predicted to be related with preferences or acceptance of policies that actively 
redistribute strangers (Uslaner, 2008). JGSS data contains variables that will capture 
the degree of generalized trust. However, the proxy variable for generalized trust is 
considered as an endogenous variable because the causality between redistribution 
preferences and generalized trust is ambiguous. Therefore, estimation results are 
thought to suffer from endogeneity bias if the proxy for generalized trust is included as 
an independent variable. It is for this reason that the proxy for generalized trust is not 
included as an individual-level control variable. 
  
for 1999 as an initial value. In addition, I also used Gini coefficients for 2004 as 
independent variables. I matched the information regarding individual 
characteristics sourced from the JGSS data with prefecture characteristics such as 
community participation rates and Gini coefficients. Thus, I was able to investigate 
how income inequality within a community affects an individual‘s preference for 
income redistribution. 
The variables used in the regression estimations are shown in Table 2, which 
provides definitions and mean comparisons of the high- and low-income groups. 
High-income earners are defined as those with a household income that is higher 
than the average household income within a prefecture. The remainder of the 
residents are defined as low-income earners. The average household income within 
a prefecture (AVINCOM) is calculated using JGSS data. The utility of people is 
thought to be affected not only by one‘s own income but also by the income level of 
neighboring people (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; 
McBride, 2001; Stutzer 2004). In other words, not only absolute income but also 
relative income is considered to be related to an individual‘s utility and, therefore, 
perceptions. This paper controls for both individual-level household income and 
average household income within residential prefectures to capture the relative 
income effect. The regional characteristics used in this paper are SC (rate of those 
who participate in community events), GINI99 and GINI04 (Gini coefficients for 
1999 and 2004, respectively), and AVINCOM (average household income within a 
prefecture). 
Turning to individual characteristics, OEQUAL and EQUAL are proxies for 
preferences for income redistribution. The question regarding income redistribution 
asked: What is your opinion of the following statement? ―It is the responsibility of 
the government to reduce the differences in income between families with high 
incomes and those with low incomes.‖ There were five response options, ranging 
from ―1 (strongly disagree)‖ to ―5 (strongly agree)‖. OEQUAL is the values that the 
respondents chose. Figure 1 shows the distribution of views regarding political 
redistribution, and reveals that the number of respondents who chose ―1‖ or ―2‖ is 
smaller than those who chose ―4‖ or ―5‖. Thus, the shape of histogram is skewed 
towards the right. Respondents most frequently chose the median number ―3‖. 
However, there is a problem with this proxy for redistribution preferences. Of the 
five possible responses, ―3 (depends)‖ requires the greatest care in interpretation. It 
is unclear whether ―depends‖ can be considered as an intermediate category, or 
whether it includes a number of respondents who might have answered in other 
  
categories if other possible responses were included in the questionnaire. To 
alleviate any bias arising from this, in addition to OEQUAL, I also used an 
alternative dummy variable ―EQUAL‖ as a proxy for preferences for redistribution. 
EQUAL takes the value of 1 if the response is ―4 (agree)‖ or ―5 (strongly agree)‖, and 
is otherwise 0. As explained later in the paper, an ordered probit model is used for 
the estimations when OEQUAL is the dependent variable. In the alternative 
specification, a probit model is used when EQUAL is the dependent variable. It can 
be seen from Table 2 that OEQUAL and EQUAL are larger for the low-income group 
than for the high-income group and are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
which is consistent with the inference that poorer people are more likely to prefer 
income redistribution to increase their welfare. 
Years of schooling, SCHOOL, is significantly greater for the high-income group 
than the low-income group, suggesting that human capital contributes to an 
increase in income levels.  
Political ideology plausibly influences preferences for redistribution and so 
should be controlled for when preferences for income redistribution are estimated 
(Bernasconi 2006; Alesina Giuliano 2009). I constructed a proxy for capturing this 
effect based on responses to the question: ―Where would you place your political 
views on a five-point scale?‖ There are five response options: ―1 (conservative)‖ to ‗5 
(progressive)‖. The placement of political views is captured by dummies: PROG_5 
takes the value of 1 when the response is ―5‖, otherwise 0. PROG_1, PROG_2, 
PROG_3, and PROG_4 are defined in a similar manner. It is of interest that 
political views did not differ between the high- and low-income groups, with the 
exception of PRGO_ 5. This tells us that political views are unrelated to individual 
income levels in Japan. 
An expectation of future income is a key determinant in preferences for income 
redistribution (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Siedler, 2008). A JGSS 
question asks ―In your opinion, how much opportunity would you say there is in 
Japanese society to improve the standard of living for you and/or your family?‖ 
There are five response options: ―1 (not sufficient at all)‖ to ―5 (sufficient)‖. 
Dummies capture the degree of improvements in standards of living: BLIFE_5 
takes the value of 1 when the response is ―5‖, otherwise 0. BLIFE_1, BLIFE_2, 
BLIFE_3, and BLIFE_4 are defined in a similar manner. As shown in Table 2, there 
are significantly larger values for BLIFE_1 and BLIFE_2 in the low-income group 
than for the high-income group. These results indicate that people in the 
low-income group are less likely to believe that there is an opportunity for 
  
improvements in standards of living than high-income people. The significantly 
larger value of BLIFE_4 for the high-income group shows that they are more likely 
to believe that there is sufficient opportunity for improvement compared with the 
low-income group. This appears to imply that income mobility is less likely to occur 
in Japan. However, interestingly, there is no significant difference in the values for 
BLIFE_5 between the high- and low-income group, which suggests that both poor 
and rich people have a similar expectation regarding upward mobility. As a whole, 
Japanese people appear to hold a mixed perception regarding income mobility. 
 
3.2. Social capital and its definition 
 
According to Putnam (2000), social capital is defined as the features of a social 
organization such as networks and norms, and that social trust facilitates 
coordination and cooperation. Hence, social capital can be interpreted in various 
ways, thereby causing ambiguity and criticism regarding its measurement and 
definition (e.g., Paldam 2000; Sobel 2002; Durlauf 2002; Bjørnskov 2006). The effects 
of social capital are considered to differ according to its definition and choice of proxy. 
Therefore, for an in-depth study, it is important to focus on just one aspect of social 
capital. In recent works, researchers have tended to indicate exactly what type of 
social capital was used as a proxy when analyzing the effect of social capital. As 
stated earlier, this study uses community involvement as social capital to examine 
its externality on preferences for redistribution. Frequency of participation in 
community events can be theoretically interpreted as an investment in social 
capital (Glaeser et al., 2002). With regard to Japan, prior works have reported that 
community involvement increases the benefit for community members by 
decreasing crime rates (Yamamura 2009) and the number of deaths in natural 
disasters (Yamamura 2010). These studies show that involvement in one‘s 
community has an important role in Japanese society. In contrast, frequent 
interaction among community members is also thought to increase negative 
externalities such as envy toward richer members. Japan has a different cultural 
and historical background from Western countries. Thus, an examination into the 
effect of social capital in Japan is considered useful to compare the role of social 
capital in Eastern countries with that in Western countries. 
 
3.3. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
In Figures 2(1) and 3(1), the vertical axis shows the average OEQAUL within a 
  
prefecture. In Figures 2(2) and 3(2), the vertical axis shows EQAUL (rate of those 
who prefer redistribution within a prefecture). A cursory examination of Figures 
2(1) and (2) reveals a positive association between social capital and a preference for 
redistribution, which is congruent with the hypotheses raised previously. However, 
this relationship is observed when individual characteristics are not controlled for. 
A more precise examination calls for a regression analysis using individual-level 
data matched with characteristics from residential areas.  
Turning now to the relationship between income inequality and preferences for 
redistribution, Figures 3(1) and (2) show that the Gini coefficients for 1999 are not 
associated with a preference for income redistribution. Derin-Güre and Uler (2010) 
found that income inequality had a differing effect on the private charitable 
contributions of high-income earners and those of low-income earners. Preference 
for redistribution within a prefecture is calculated using observations from both 
high- and low-income groups. Therefore, the effect of income inequality is thought to 
be neutralized, and as such it is worth comparing the effects of income inequality on 
preferences for redistribution between high- and low-income groups using 
regression estimations.  
For the purpose of examining the hypotheses proposed previously, the estimated 
function of the baseline model takes the following form: 
 
OEQUAL im (or EQUAL im) = 0 + 1 SC m+ 2AVINCOMm + 3GINI99m + 
4INCOMim + 5AGEim + 6MARRYim + 7SCHOOLim + 8UNEMPim + 9MALEm 
+ 10PROG_2im + 11PROG_3im + 12PROG_4im + 13PROG_5im + uim, 
where OEQUAL im (or EQUAL im) represents the dependent variable in individual i, 
and prefecture m. Regression parameters are represented by . As explained earlier, 
values for OEQUAL range from 1 to 5 and so the ordered probit model is used to 
conduct the estimations. In the alternative specification, EQUAL is the dummy 
variable and so takes either 1 or 0. Hence, the probit model is used when EQUAL is 
the dependent variable. The error term is represented by uim. It is reasonable to 
assume that the observations may be spatially correlated within a prefecture, as the 
preference of one agent may well relate to the preference of another in the same 
prefecture. To consider such spatial correlation in line with this assumption, I used 
the Stata cluster command and calculated z-statistics using robust standard errors. 
The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of spatial correlation can be 
unique to each prefecture.  
In previous works, individual characteristics have been used to measure levels of 
  
socialization in a neighborhood (Stutzer 2004; Luttmer 2005). It seems plausible 
that people who feel happier are more likely to have contact with their neighbors. If 
so, those who are satisfied and do not prefer redistribution are less likely to have 
contact with neighbors. Therefore, the causality between socialization and 
preference for redistribution is ambiguous. To alleviate this bias, this paper 
examined the effect of social capital formed in residential areas rather than an 
individual‘s socialization. Hence, SC is incorporated as an independent variable and 
is anticipated to take the positive sign. AVINCOM and GINI99 are included to 
control for relative income and income inequality within a prefecture. As suggested 
by Luttmer (2005), increases in average income within a locality lead to reductions 
in the residents‘ welfare. People are thought to support redistribution to improve 
their welfare. In this paper, AVINCOM is expected to take the positive sign. 
However, an increase in AVINCOM appears to lead people to expect that they can 
earn more. If so, the sign for AVINCOM becomes negative. If people wish to address 
inequality, the sign for GINI99 should be positive. Furthermore, income inequality 
increases the psychological externality of poor against rich, leading rich people to 
support income redistribution. Therefore, GINI99 is more likely to take the positive 
sign for rich people than for poor people. In the alternative specification, GINI 04 is 
also included in addition to GINI99. 
Following existing literature (e.g., Ravallian and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and and 
Gruüner, 2002; Ohtake and Tomioka 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer 
and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano 2009), INCOME, AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, 
and MALE are included as independent variables to control for individual 
characteristics. Political views are captured by PROG_2–PROG_5, with PROG_1 
(conservative view) as the reference group. Progressive views generally support 
left-wing policies such as political income redistribution. Hence, the coefficients of 
PROG_2–PROG_5 are predicted to take the positive sign, with the absolute value of 
the coefficient PROG_5 to be largest among them. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results of the ordered probit model are presented in Tables 3(a), 4 
and 5. The probit model results that correspond to Table 3(a) are shown in Table 
3(b). The results of the baseline model are reported in Tables 3(a) and (b). Table 4 
shows the results for when both GINI99 are GINI04 are included. As presented in 
the theoretical model (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and OK, 2001), expectations 
  
regarding upward and downward mobility determine an individual‘s attitude or 
preference for redistribution. Prior empirical works estimating preference for 
redistribution are in line with the theoretical model and stress the role of 
expectation regarding future income or social position (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 
2005; Rainer and Siedler, 2008).  
Aside from the inclusion of the baseline model to capture this effect, I also 
incorporated BLIFE_2, BLIFE_3, BLIFE_4, and BLIFE_5 as independent variables 
in an alternative model. These results are exhibited in Table 5. 
In each table, the estimation results, based on a sample of rich and poor 
respondents, are shown in columns (1) and (4). The results for the rich respondents 
are presented in columns (2) and (5), while the results for the poor respondents are 
presented in columns (3) and (6). As argued by Luttmer (2005), there is ―the 
possibility that cross-section results are driven by selection of people who are 
happier by nature into areas that are relatively poor… One might worry that 
movers may have had something unobserved happen to them‖ (Luttmer 2005, 977). 
This unobserved factor is a possible reason for estimation bias. The JGSS provided 
data regarding not only current residential prefectures but also the residential 
prefectures of the respondents at 15 years of age. If the current residential 
prefecture is not the same prefecture at 15 years old, respondents are defined as 
―movers‖. For the purpose of alleviating this bias, following Luttmer (2005), I also 
conducted the estimations by excluding all respondents who had moved to a 
different prefecture. These results are exhibited in columns (4)–(6) of Tables 3 (a), 
(b), 4, and 5. 
In Table 3(a), the signs for SC take the expected positive signs and are 
statistically significant, with the exception of column (3). AVINCOM takes the 
negative sign and is statistically significant in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6). This 
suggests that an increase in the average income leads low-income earners to be less 
inclined to support a redistribution policy. Hence, concerning redistribution policies, 
average income is not related to poorer people‘s negative feelings (e.g., envy) but to 
positive feelings such as expectations of higher earnings. Interestingly, GINI99 
takes a significantly positive sign only for the high-income group. It follows then 
that income inequality represents a psychological externality for rich people, and 
hence they support income redistribution. As for individual characteristics, the sign 
for INCOME is negative in all estimations, and is not statistically significant for the 
low-income group. This indicates that a reduction in income via a policy of income 
redistribution leads rich people to oppose such a policy. Significant negative values 
  
for SCHOOL are observed in all estimations. I interpret this result as suggesting 
that people with higher education are more likely to expect higher future earnings. 
UNEMP takes the positive signs in all estimations, but is only statistically 
significant in columns (1) and (2), implying that the effect of job status on 
preference for redistribution is ambiguous. Consistent with expectations, PROG_5 
takes a significant positive sign in all estimations. This implies that political views 
influence preferences for redistribution. 
Results reported in Table 3(b) are similar to those in Table 3(a). The coefficients 
exhibited in Table 3(a) cannot be interpreted as marginal effects and it is difficult to 
interpret them in the ordered probit model. Therefore, I will focus largely on the 
reported marginal effects of the probit model. In Table 3(b), the positive sign for SC 
continues to be statistically significant in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), but not in 
columns (3) and (6). Therefore, SC influences rich people but not poor people. The 
focus is further narrowed to the results that are obtained after ―movers‖ were 
excluded from the sample. Its marginal effects are 0.28 in column (5), meaning that 
a 1% increase in the rate of participation in community events leads to a 0.28% 
increase in support for redistribution policies. The negative sign of AVINCOM is 
only statistically significant in column (6). GINI99 takes a significant positive sign 
only in columns (2) and (5), implying that income inequality results in richer people 
supporting redistribution policies but not poorer people. The marginal effect shown 
in column (5) can be interpreted as suggesting that a 0.1-point increase in Gini 
coefficients leads to a 0.13-point increase in support from rich people for income 
redistribution.  
As demonstrated in Figure 2(b), there are outliers with a rate of redistribution 
preferences that are clearly below 0.50.10 These outliers possibly drive the results of 
Tables 2 and 3. Thus, it is necessary to show that the main results of Tables 3(a) and 
(b) are indeed robust. For this purpose, a prefecture-level jackknife exercise was 
performed with the outliers excluded from the sample. The results corresponding to 
Tables 3 (a) and (b) are presented in Tables A1(a) and (b), respectively. Tables A1(a) 
and (b) appear in the Appendix. Results of Tables A1(a) and (b) are nearly identical 
to those in Tables 3(a) and (b). It follows then that the results of Tables 3(a) and (b) 
are not driven by the outliers. 
Turning now to Table 4, results for SC, AVINCOM, and GINI99 are similar to 
those presented in Table 3(a). The sign for GINI04 is negative with the exception of 
                                                   
10 The rates of redistribution preferences for Gunma and Saga prefectures are 0.45 and 
0.46, respectively. 
  
column (5). Furthermore, GINI04 is not statistically significant in all estimations. 
This indicates that GINI99 has a significant effect on preferences of rich people, 
whereas GINI04 has no influence at all. This shows that the effects of income 
inequality are not stable and so care should be taken when interpreting these 
results. Concerning Table 5, results for SC, AVINCOM, GINI99, and GINI04 in 
columns (1)–(3) are similar to those in Table 4. However, the sign for SC is positive 
but not statistically significant in columns (5) and (6). This result is partly because 
of the reduction in observations used for the estimations. In line with the prediction, 
the signs for BLIFE_2–BLIFE_5 are negative in all estimations. Furthermore, 
BLIFE_3–BLIFE_5 are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (3), 
(4), and (6). In contrast, only BLIFE_5 is statistically significant in columns (2) and 
(5). Thus, expectations for a ―better life‖ have a greater influence on preferences for 
income redistribution for poor people than rich people. 
To sum the various estimated results presented thus far, I conclude, as a whole, 
that the estimation results examined in this section are consistent with Hypothesis 
2, and support it reasonably well, but not Hypothesis 1. The above findings imply 
that rich people are more likely to support a redistribution policy when they live in 
an area where residents have frequent contact with each other. This is in line with 
findings from the United States, where rich people are more likely to increase 
charitable contributions for inequality reduction than poor people (Derin-Güre and 
Uler 2010). These results imply that, for rich people, the effect of negative 
externalities caused by the envy of poor people is greater in areas supporting a 
tightly-knit community. In contrast, poor people‘s attitudes regarding redistribution 
policies are unlikely to depend on the degree of residential contact within a 
community.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more, and so residents 
are concerned not only about their income but also the average local income. The 
influence of relative income is greater for those who socialize more in their 
neighborhood (Stutzer 2004, Luttmer 2005). Preference for income redistribution 
are inevitably influenced by relative income and also by social capital captured by 
frequency of contact with neighbors. However, little is known about the effect of 
social capital on preferences for income redistribution. Further, there is the 
possibility that people who feel happier are more likely to socialize with neighbors. 
  
Accordingly, the causality between socialization and happiness is ambiguous. To 
alleviate this bias, this paper focused on the degree of social capital present in the 
neighborhoods of individuals, rather than by looking at socialization. In this paper, 
social capital was measured by the rate of participation in community activities in 
1996. Matching this data with micro data from JGSS for 2000–2008, I estimated the 
effect of social capital in residential areas on preferences for income redistribution. 
The major findings are that after controlling for various individual 
characteristics, people are more likely to prefer income redistribution in areas 
where there are higher rates of community participation. This is in line with 
Luttmer (2005), implying that the consumption externality suggested by Becker 
(1974) depends on the degree of frequency of personal interaction within a 
community. The effect of social capital on preference for income redistribution was 
more clearly observed in the high-income group than the low-income group. From 
this, I derive the argument that for rich people, frequency of interaction increases 
the effect of the negative externality caused by the envy of poorer people. Further, 
the effect of the negative externality outweighs the negative effect of reducing the 
income of the wealthy via income redistribution policies.  
In rural Asian villages, it has been observed that an individual with a higher 
socioeconomic status will use his/her own influence and resources to provide 
protection and/or benefits to someone with a lower status (Hayami, 2001). Such 
relationships are called patron–client relationships by anthropologists and 
sociologists (Scott, 1972). Rural Asian villages are characterized by long-term and 
intensive personal interactions between village members. Even in modern Japanese 
society, when community members frequently attend community events and 
interact with each other, the relationships between members mirror the 
relationships in rural villages. If such relationships exist to a certain extent in 
modern Japanese society, then the wealthy are expected to play the role of patron 
and offer patronage to the poor (client). The finding that social capital leads the rich 
to prefer income redistribution possibly reflects the cultural and anthropological 
characteristics of parts of Asia.  
However, the effect of the residential area characteristics appeared to vary 
according to individual characteristics. That is, even when individuals live in 
tightly-knit communities with significant social capital, their preferences are not 
necessarily influenced by neighboring people if they do not socialize in the 
neighborhood. Owing to a lack of data, however, this paper cannot explore this issue 
further. Furthermore, Japan is generally characterized as a racially homogenous 
  
society. Aside from such homogeneity, Japan‘s historical and cultural backgrounds 
also distinguish it from Western countries. Effect of social capital varies according 
to institutional strength (Ahlerup et al., 2009). Hence, to test the generality of these 
findings, it is necessary to examine the hypotheses proposed in this paper using 
other countries with different characteristics. In addition, the generalized trust 
appears to be related to income inequality (Uslaner, 2008). Inevitably, generalized 
trust is thought to influence redistribution preferences. Thus, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate how generalized trust affects preferences by controlling 
for endogeneity bias. These remaining issues require attention in future studies. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of views regarding income redistribution 
Note:  
The question asked of respondents was: What is your opinion of the following 
statement? ―It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences 
in income between families with high incomes and those with low incomes.‖ 
There were five response options: ―1 (strongly disagree)‖ to ―5 (strongly agree)‖. 
The number indicated in the figure is equivalent to the number of responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 2(a). Relationship between social capital and preference for income 
distribution 
 
  
Figure 2(b). 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Figure 3(a). Relationship between Gini coefficients for 1999 and preference for income 
distribution 
 
 
Figure 3(b). Relationship between Gini coefficients for 1999 and preference for income 
distribution 
 
  
 
     Table 1.  Construction of research sample 
  Year Observations from 
original sample 
Observations used in 
analysis 
2000 
2,893 1,920 
2001 
2,790 1,786 
2002 
2,953 1,915 
2003 
3,663 1,287 
2005 
2,023 1,056 
2006 
4,254 1,248 
2008 
4,220 2,596 
Total 
27,790 11,808 
Note: Observations were used in the analysis when they were available to be used for all 
variables in the estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     Table 2 
Mean values for high-income household group and low-income household group  
 Definitions High- 
income 
Low- 
income 
t-statistics 
Regional 
characteristics 
    
SC Rate of those who actively participate in 
community events 
0.48 0.47 4.18*** 
AVINCOM Average household income within a prefecture 
(million yen) 
6.14 6.09 4.31*** 
GINI99 Gini coefficients for 1999 0.295 0.295 1.26 
GINI04 Gini coefficients for 2004 0.302 0.303 3.02*** 
Individual 
characteristics 
    
OEQUAL Degree of agreement with the argument that the 
government should reduce income inequality: 
1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
3.62 3.82 14.1*** 
EQUAL Response to the question regarding income 
redistribution, those whose response was 4 
(agree) or 5 (strongly agree) take 1, otherwise 0. 
0.52 0.60 11.6*** 
INCOME Individual household income 
(million yens) 
9.79 3.43 140*** 
AGE Ages 50.0 55.3 22.4*** 
MARRY It takes 1 if respondents are currently married, 
otherwise 0. 
0.81 0.75 10.1*** 
SCHOOL 
 
Years of schooling 12.4 11.6 22.8*** 
UNEMP It takes 1 if respondents are currently 
unemployed, otherwise 0. 
0.01 0.02 2.58*** 
MALE It takes 1 if respondents are male, otherwise 0. 0.44 0.47 4.38*** 
PROG_1 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 1, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.07 0.07 1.25 
PROG_2 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 2, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 ( progressive) 
0.20 0.20 0.25 
PROG_3 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 3, otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.52 0.51 1.49 
PROG_4 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 4, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.16 0.16 1.02 
PROG_5 
 
Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 5, otherwise 0. 
0.03 0.04 3.59*** 
  
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
BLIFE_1 
 
Concerning “opportunity for better life”, it takes 
1 if respondents choose 1, otherwise 0. 
1 (not sufficient at all) – 5 (sufficient) 
0.08 0.11 8.03*** 
BLIFE_2 
 
Concerning “opportunity for better life”, it takes 
1 if respondents choose 2, otherwise 0. 
1 (not sufficient at all) – 5 (sufficient) 
0.37 0.39 2.58*** 
BLIFE_3 
 
Concerning “opportunity for better life”, it takes 
1 if respondents choose 3, otherwise 0. 
1 (not sufficient at all) – 5 (sufficient) 
0.37 0.34  4.24*** 
BLIFE_4 
 
Concerning “opportunity for better life”, it takes 
1 if respondents choose 4, otherwise 0. 
1 (not sufficient at all) – 5 (sufficient) 
0.13 0.11  4.13*** 
BLIFE_5 
 
Concerning “opportunity for better life”, it takes 
1 if respondents choose 5, otherwise 0. 
1 (not sufficient at all) – 5 (sufficient) 
0.24 0.21 1.39 
Note: All observations used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean difference test 
between high- and low-income household groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3(a)  Baseline model: dependent variable is OEQUAL (ordered probit model) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.50*** 
   (2.78) 
   0.69*** 
   (2.77) 
   0.39 
   (1.40) 
    0.55** 
   (2.31) 
   0.62* 
   (1.67) 
   0.58* 
   (1.90) 
AVINCOM –0.02* 
(–1.80) 
–0.01 
(–0.61) 
–0.04** 
(–2.13) 
 –0.02* 
(–1.86) 
–0.001 
(–0.06) 
–0.05*** 
(–2.81) 
GINI99 –0.22 
(–0.30) 
2.41*** 
(3.30) 
–2.16* 
(–1.70) 
 0.13 
(0.17) 
3.28** 
(2.53) 
–2.16 
(–1.58) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME –0.03*** 
(–9.99) 
–0.03*** 
(–5.83) 
–0.01 
(–0.91) 
 –0.03*** 
(–8.24) 
–0.03*** 
(–5.22) 
–0.01 
(–0.81) 
AGE   0.004*** 
(6.81) 
  0.006*** 
(4.79) 
0.003*** 
(4.45) 
  0.003*** 
(4.04) 
  0.006*** 
(3.76) 
0.002** 
(2.49) 
MARRY   0.04* 
  (1.91) 
  0.01 
  (0.32) 
0.002 
(0.93) 
  0.03 
  (1.22) 
  –0.001 
  (–0.03) 
0.01 
(0.53) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.03*** 
  (–6.46) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.50) 
–0.02**
* 
(–4.21) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.11) 
  –0.04*** 
  (–5.00) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.82) 
UNEMP 0.16* 
(1.74) 
0.35** 
(2.25) 
0.09 
(0.81) 
 0.08 
(0.74) 
0.26 
(1.38) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
MALE   0.07*** 
  (3.14) 
  0.04 
  (1.44) 
0.08*** 
(2.70) 
  0.08*** 
  (3.82) 
  0.05 
  (1.33) 
0.11*** 
(3.28) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   –0.005 
  (–0.12) 
  –0.02 
  (–0.43) 
0.007 
(0.11) 
  0.03 
  (0.60) 
  0.01 
  (1.33) 
0.03 
(0.45) 
PROG_3 0.07 
  (1.56) 
0.04 
  (0.59) 
0.09 
(1.33) 
 0.09 
  (1.57) 
0.05 
  (0.24) 
0.11 
(1.41) 
PROG_4 0.15*** 
(3.51) 
0.09 
(1.32) 
0.21*** 
(2.99) 
 0.17*** 
(3.55) 
0.13 
(0.67) 
0.21*** 
(2.88) 
PROG_5    0.25*** 
  (3.27) 
   0.21* 
  (1.71) 
0.27** 
(2.44) 
   0.27*** 
  (2.80) 
   0.28* 
  (1.99) 
0.25** 
(2.05) 
Wald Statistics 1065   630    348  775   412 240 
Observations   11808   5152 6656   8479   3680 4799 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as independent 
variables but are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 3(b)  Dependent variable is EQUAL (probit model) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age. 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.19** 
   (2.09) 
   0.21* 
   (1.74) 
   0.18 
   (1.52) 
    0.22* 
   (1.86) 
   0.28* 
   (1.69) 
   0.20 
   (1.46) 
AVINCOM –0.006 
(–1.14) 
–0.006 
(–0.97) 
–0.01 
(–1.50) 
 –0.006 
(–1.06) 
–0.003 
(–0.36) 
–0.01* 
(–1.86) 
GINI99 –0.009 
(–0.03) 
0.93*** 
(2.91) 
–0.70 
(–1.36) 
 0.04 
(0.13) 
1.30** 
(2.34) 
–0.84 
(–1.63) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME –0.01*** 
(–7.73) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.40) 
–0.0007 
(–0.18) 
 –0.01*** 
(–6.27) 
–0.01*** 
(–3.49) 
–0.001 
(–0.36) 
AGE   0.001*** 
(6.52) 
  0.002*** 
(4.37) 
0.001*** 
(4.89) 
  0.001*** 
(3.64) 
  0.002*** 
(3.46) 
0.001*** 
(2.93) 
MARRY   0.01 
  (1.25) 
  –0.005 
  (–0.22) 
–0.008*
* 
(–2.58) 
  0.01 
  (0.85) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.56) 
0.01 
(0.61) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.85) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.70) 
0.04 
(1.07) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.12) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.27) 
–0.006* 
(–1.71) 
UNEMP 0.06* 
(1.80) 
0.11 
(1.46) 
0.04 
(1.07) 
 0.04 
(1.06) 
0.08 
(0.96) 
0.03 
(0.72) 
MALE   0.05*** 
  (5.30) 
  0.05*** 
  (3.62) 
0.05*** 
(3.67) 
  0.05*** 
  (4.85) 
  0.05*** 
  (2.82) 
0.05*** 
(3.39) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   0.02 
  (1.37) 
  0.01 
  (0.54) 
0.03 
(1.18) 
  0.04* 
  (2.03) 
  0.04 
  (1.17) 
0.04 
(1.55) 
PROG_3 0.02 
  (1.57) 
0.23 
  (0.81) 
0.03 
(1.25) 
 0.03 
  (1.28) 
0.03 
  (0.99) 
0.02 
(0.90) 
PROG_4 0.09*** 
(5.38) 
0.06** 
(2.32) 
0.12*** 
(4.48) 
 0.10*** 
(5.34) 
0.10*** 
(2.72) 
0.11*** 
(3.96) 
PROG_5    0.10*** 
  (3.74) 
   0.12*** 
  (2.69) 
0.08** 
(2.52) 
   0.10*** 
  (2.64) 
   0.15*** 
  (2.69) 
0.06 
(1.54) 
Wald statistics 585   417    292  545   408 180 
Observations   11808   5152 6656   8479   3680 4799 
Note: Numbers indicate marginal effect. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as 
independent variables but are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 4  Dependent variable is OEQUAL (ordered probit model including GINI04) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.50*** 
   (2.75) 
   0.69*** 
   (2.95) 
   0.38 
   (1.34) 
    0.53** 
   (2.35) 
   0.66* 
   (1.81) 
   0.53* 
   (1.70) 
AVINCOM –0.02* 
(–1.80) 
–0.01 
(–0.60) 
–0.04** 
(–2.13) 
 –0.02* 
(–1.84) 
–0.001 
(–0.06) 
–0.05*** 
(–2.72) 
GINI99 –0.16 
(–0.15) 
2.41** 
(2.31) 
–2.09 
(–1.20) 
 0.42 
(0.39) 
2.73* 
(1.80) 
–1.36 
(–0.75) 
GINI04 –0.13 
(–0.12) 
–0.0002 
(–0.00) 
–0.14 
(–0.09) 
 –0.62 
(–0.44) 
1.08 
(0.54) 
–1.57 
(–0.90) 
Wald statistics 1067   632    392  803   445 242 
Observations   11808   5152 6656   8479   3680 4799 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant, year dummies and other independent variables 
used in Table 2(a) are included as independent variables but are not reported because of space 
limitations.  
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Table 5  Dependent variable is OEQUAL (ordered probit model including “expected better life” 
dummies and GINI04) 
 All   People live in the same they lived in at 15 years 
of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.40** 
   (2.29) 
   0.52** 
   (2.01) 
   0.38 
   (1.36) 
    0.40* 
   (1.80) 
   0.44 
   (1.14) 
   0.49 
   (1.54) 
AVINCOM –0.02 
(–1.54) 
–0.007 
(–0.41) 
–0.04* 
(–1.87) 
 –0.02* 
(–1.79) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
–0.05*** 
(–2.67) 
GINI99 0.07 
(0.07) 
2.88** 
(2.54) 
–2.09 
(–1.25) 
 0.79 
(0.68) 
3.45** 
(2.16) 
–1.32 
(–0.72) 
GINI04 –0.36 
(–0.30) 
–0.57 
(–0.33) 
–0.04 
(–0.03) 
 –0.99 
(–0.66) 
0.28 
(0.13) 
–1.57 
(–0.85) 
Individual 
characteristics 
    
BLIFE_1 <Reference group>  <Reference group>  
BLIFE_2 –0.06 
(–1.53) 
–0.04 
(–0.59) 
–0.06 
(–1.30) 
 –0.05 
(–1.48) 
–0.02 
(–0.33) 
–0.07 
(–1.64) 
BLIFE_3 –0.16*** 
(–4.15) 
–0.10 
(–1.26) 
–0.19*** 
(–4.29) 
 –0.15*** 
(–3.64) 
–0.09 
(–1.04) 
–0.18*** 
(–4.02) 
BLIFE_4 –0.16*** 
(–3.91) 
–0.13 
(–1.54) 
–0.17*** 
(–3.17) 
 –0.14*** 
(–3.07) 
–0.12 
(–1.31) 
–0.15** 
(–2.40) 
BLIFE_5 –0.41*** 
(–6.48) 
–0.31** 
(–2.22) 
–0.51*** 
(–5.22) 
 –0.47*** 
(–4.65) 
–0.38** 
(–2.20) 
–0.54*** 
(–4.28) 
Wald statistics 1218   593    526  998   431 228 
Observations   11048   4814 6234   7932   3440 4492 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant, year dummies, and other independent variables 
used in Table 2(a) are included as independent variables but are not reported because of space 
limitations.  
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Appendix. 
Table A1(a)  Excluding outliers: dependent variable is OEQUAL (ordered probit model) 
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.58*** 
   (3.03) 
   0.82*** 
   (3.16) 
   0.43 
   (1.33) 
    0.65** 
   (2.57) 
   0.81* 
   (1.96) 
   0.63* 
   (1.77) 
AVINCOM –0.02 
(–1.52) 
–0.01 
(–0.34) 
–0.04* 
(–1.88) 
 –0.02 
(–1.57) 
0.0003 
(0.15) 
–0.05** 
(–2.52) 
GINI99 –0.19 
(–0.23) 
2.49*** 
(3.14) 
–2.15 
(–1.44) 
 0.20 
(0.23) 
3.44** 
(2.18) 
–2.08 
(–1.38) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME –0.03*** 
(–9.61) 
–0.03*** 
(–5.57) 
–0.01 
(–0.74) 
 –0.03*** 
(–7.96) 
–0.03*** 
(–5.07) 
–0.01 
(–0.74) 
AGE   0.004*** 
(6.62) 
  0.006*** 
(4.71) 
0.003*** 
(4.40) 
  0.003*** 
(3.82) 
  0.005*** 
(3.71) 
0.002** 
(2.38) 
MARRY   0.03 
  (1.58) 
  0.01 
  (0.29) 
0.002 
(0.60) 
  0.02 
  (0.91) 
  –0.001 
  (–0.00) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.03*** 
  (–6.33) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.66) 
–0.02*** 
(–4.00) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.19) 
  –0.04*** 
  (–5.31) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.73) 
UNEMP 0.16* 
(1.73) 
0.35** 
(2.08) 
0.10 
(0.86) 
 0.09 
(0.75) 
0.25 
(1.24) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
MALE   0.07*** 
  (3.02) 
  0.04 
  (1.46) 
0.08** 
(2.50) 
  0.08*** 
  (3.71) 
  0.05 
  (1.32) 
0.11*** 
(3.12) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   –0.01 
  (–0.24) 
  –0.04 
  (–0.63) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
  0.02 
  (0.44) 
  -0.002 
  (-0.04) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
PROG_3 0.06 
  (1.46) 
0.02 
  (0.41) 
0.09 
(1.32) 
 0.08 
  (1.45) 
0.03 
  (0.42) 
0.12 
(1.41) 
PROG_4 0.15*** 
(3.32) 
0.08 
(1.14) 
0.21*** 
(2.86) 
 0.17*** 
(3.36) 
0.12 
(1.33) 
0.21*** 
(2.82) 
PROG_5    0.25*** 
  (3.22) 
   0.19 
  (1.53) 
0.28** 
(2.50) 
   0.28*** 
  (2.70) 
   0.25* 
  (1.78) 
0.27** 
(2.11) 
Wald Statistics 1013   753    370  818   446 251 
Observations   11581   5050 6531   8284   3591 4693 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using 
standard errors obtained by prefecture-level jackknife method. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included 
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as independent variables but are not reported because of space limitations. The two prefectures 
where redistribution preferences were below 0.50 are considered as outliers and are excluded from 
the sample.  
 
Table A1(b)  Excluding outliers: Dependent variable is EQUAL (probit model)  
 All   People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 
15 years of age. 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
SC    0.24** 
   (2.56) 
   0.29** 
   (2.29) 
   0.21 
   (1.55) 
    0.29** 
   (2.28) 
   0.39** 
   (2.14) 
   0.23 
   (1.50) 
AVINCOM –0.004 
(–0.84) 
–0.004 
(–0.59) 
–0.01 
(–1.09) 
 –0.005 
(–0.75) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
–0.01* 
(–1.55) 
GINI99 0.02 
(0.06) 
0.98*** 
(2.77) 
–0.67 
(–1.27) 
 0.09 
(0.26) 
1.37** 
(2.05) 
–0.79 
(–1.35) 
Individual 
characteristics 
       
INCOME –0.01*** 
(–7.23) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.14) 
–0.0006 
(–0.06) 
 –0.01*** 
(–5.92) 
–0.01*** 
(–3.39) 
–0.001 
(–0.28) 
AGE   0.001*** 
(6.27) 
  0.002*** 
(4.10) 
0.001*** 
(4.92) 
  0.001*** 
(3.35) 
  0.002*** 
(3.16) 
0.001*** 
(2.81) 
MARRY   0.01 
  (1.04) 
  –0.006 
  (–0.24) 
 0.005 
(0.41) 
  0.01 
  (0.74) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.50) 
0.007 
(0.45) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.95) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–4.05) 
-0.008** 
(-2.53) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.33) 
  –0.01*** 
  (–3.73) 
–0.006* 
(–1.69) 
UNEMP 0.06* 
(1.83) 
0.11 
(1.34) 
0.05 
(1.16) 
 0.05 
(1.10) 
0.08 
(0.85) 
0.04 
(0.83) 
MALE   0.05*** 
  (5.04) 
  0.05*** 
  (3.57) 
0.05*** 
(3.39) 
  0.05*** 
  (4.61) 
  0.05*** 
  (2.69) 
0.05*** 
(3.18) 
PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group> 
PROG_2   0.02 
  (1.22) 
  0.01 
  (0.39) 
0.03 
(1.06) 
  0.04* 
  (1.85) 
  0.03 
  (0.98) 
0.04 
(1.45) 
PROG_3 0.02 
  (1.50) 
0.02 
  (0.79) 
0.03 
(1.22) 
 0.03 
  (1.22) 
0.03 
  (0.86) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
PROG_4 0.09*** 
(5.14) 
0.06** 
(2.17) 
0.11*** 
(4.25) 
 0.10*** 
(5.09) 
0.09** 
(2.55) 
0.11*** 
(3.82) 
PROG_5    0.10*** 
  (3.75) 
   0.12*** 
  (2.48) 
0.09** 
(2.77) 
   0.10*** 
  (2.64) 
   0.14** 
  (2.46) 
0.07* 
(1.79) 
Wald statistics 594   452    308  539   393 198 
Observations   11581   5050 6531   8284   3591 4693 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using standard 
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errors obtained by prefecture-level jackknife method. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as 
independent variables but are not reported because of space limitations. The two prefectures where 
redistribution preferences were below 0.50 are considered as outliers and are excluded from the 
sample.  
 
